{"id":7869,"date":"2024-03-22T23:51:55","date_gmt":"2024-03-22T23:51:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/2024\/03\/22\/reputational-defense-or-labor-mobilization\/"},"modified":"2024-03-22T23:51:55","modified_gmt":"2024-03-22T23:51:55","slug":"reputational-defense-or-labor-mobilization","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/2024\/03\/22\/reputational-defense-or-labor-mobilization\/","title":{"rendered":"Reputational Defense or Labor Mobilization?"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<p>While North Korea is notorious for one of the world\u2019s worst human rights abuses, the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) often makes political statements and laws that seemingly emphasize women\u2019s rights.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn1\" id=\"_ftnref1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> Starting even in the 1930s, the first North Korean leader, Kim Il-sung, who was then a member of the Korean guerilla faction, addressed the issue of gender equality at the Party of the People\u2019s Revolutionary Government and outlined the need to respect and liberate women in the Ten Codes of the Joguk Kwangbok Association.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn2\" id=\"_ftnref2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> His successor, Kim Jong-il, also emphasized the role of women in pushing \u201cone of the two wheels of the revolutionary chariot\u201d for the state\u2019s socialist reforms.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn3\" id=\"_ftnref3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> Kim Jong-un, the current North Korean leader, has also put more women at the forefront and has implemented more women-oriented policies.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn4\" id=\"_ftnref4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> Such a focus on women\u2019s rights becomes more apparent in North Korea\u2019s laws. For instance, the Law on Sex Equality (1946), the Socialist Constitution (1972), and the Criminal Law (2012) purportedly protect women\u2019s social, educational, and political rights, as well as punish sexual violence.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn5\" id=\"_ftnref5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a> The Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Women (2010) stipulates that international treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), should be enforced as domestic law.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn6\" id=\"_ftnref6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>However, the reality of North Korean women\u2019s lives hardly reflects the ideals of these declarations and laws. North Korean women suffer from a serious lack of basic healthcare, sanitation, and nutrition.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn7\" id=\"_ftnref7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a> Women in political prisons are especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation by prison guards.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn8\" id=\"_ftnref8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, the North Korean regime often forces infanticide on pregnant women if they are repatriated from China or raped by the guards or government officials.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn9\" id=\"_ftnref9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> Being members of a strictly patriarchal society, North Korean women also bear \u201ca double burden of social economic activity, which renders them inferior to men, as well as housework and childcare.\u201d<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn10\" id=\"_ftnref10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, cases of forced marriage are common in spite of laws such as the Family Law (2009) that guarantee women\u2019s freedom of marriage.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn11\" id=\"_ftnref11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a> Regarding women\u2019s political activities, the female deputies in the Supreme People\u2019s Assembly face difficulties in setting women-related agendas since most discuss and praise the assembly\u2019s budget and settlement policies.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn12\" id=\"_ftnref12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Given its long record of blatant failures to uphold women\u2019s rights, it is rather puzzling that North Korea continues to place a political and legal emphasis on women\u2019s empowerment. Based on the assumption that the DPRK does not aim to improve women\u2019s rights through its policies genuinely, this paper seeks to analyze the driving factors of the regime\u2019s apparent interest in women\u2019s issues. Two competing explanations could provide insights into the Kim regime\u2019s motivations. The first argues that North Korea creates women-oriented laws and institutions to pacify international criticisms over its human rights violations and thereby defend its reputation. The second explains that the Kim regime employs the rhetoric of women\u2019s empowerment to justify and further its mobilization of women\u2019s labor for building a socialist economy. After testing the two explanations, this article will conclude by choosing the more plausible explanation and analyzing its implications for North Korean society and the international community.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Explanation One: Reputational Defense<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In an increasingly globalized world, states tend to respond sensitively to international criticisms,<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn13\" id=\"_ftnref13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a> and North Korea is no exception. The DPRK has often demonstrated its sensitivity to other states\u2019 censure of its human rights abuses, sometimes even responding with the boycott of talks on nuclear weapons.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn14\" id=\"_ftnref14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> Regardless of whether North Korea denies or acknowledges these charges, the state\u2019s past behavior suggests that its desire for reputational defense lies central to its sensitive response to international opprobrium.<\/p>\n<p>In the past, North Korea has often pushed for authoritarian image management efforts to promote an image of legitimacy and cultivate diplomatic ties beyond the communist world.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn15\" id=\"_ftnref15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a> For example, beginning in the early 1970s, the DPRK sent gymnastic advisors to developing countries such as Somalia and Uganda without charge, which helped build relations with these countries and strengthen its national image in its competition against South Korea.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn16\" id=\"_ftnref16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, through setting up foreign friendship associations such as the Nigerian Committee for the Study of Juche Idea and the Korean Friendship Association (KFA) in Spain, North Korea has sought to improve its reputation and address anti-DPRK biases in global media.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn17\" id=\"_ftnref17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, as part of its repatriation efforts, North Korea has tried to present its positive image toward Koreans in Japan via propaganda campaigns of Chongryon, its de facto embassy in Japan.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn18\" id=\"_ftnref18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>North Korea thus makes concrete efforts to manage its image for specific objectives, and this also applies to the issue of gender equality and human rights as Pyongyang presents its women-oriented policies and rhetoric to the international audience, specifically the United Nations (UN). Despite its egregious human rights violations, the DPRK tries to promote a positive image of legitimacy and defend its reputation in largely three ways: 1) claiming that it has sufficient legal mechanisms corresponding to the UN human rights treaties, 2) rejecting or making counter-accusations to international criticism, and 3) conceding to the pressure and requests from the UN, albeit sporadically.<\/p>\n<p>Starting in 1981, North Korea began to ratify major UN human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn19\" id=\"_ftnref19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a> To show its obligation to the CEDAW, the DPRK presented its own laws, such as the Law of Sex Equality (1946) and the Socialist Constitution (1972), especially Articles 65 and 77, which grant women equal social status and rights as men.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn20\" id=\"_ftnref20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, Pyongyang established the National Committee for Implementing International Human Rights Treaties in 2015 to ensure that the CEDAW is integrated into its state policies.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn21\" id=\"_ftnref21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a> It is doubtful, however, that these laws and institutions were created for actual implementation. Many observers note that the National Committee was set up simply to evade criticism and demonstrate to international society that it has adequate mechanisms for guaranteeing human rights.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn22\" id=\"_ftnref22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a> In fact, the DPRK delegations at the CEDAW sessions often deliver vague official government statements to avoid international censure instead of clearly communicating the relevant subject matter on the National Committee.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn23\" id=\"_ftnref23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a> Thus, North Korea may be creating and presenting unimplemented laws and institutions to manage its external image.<\/p>\n<p>North Korea not only claims it has legal mechanisms for guaranteeing women\u2019s rights, but it also rejects criticisms made by the UN or other states to guard its reputation. When the CEDAW report of concluding observations addressed North Korea\u2019s lack of legal protection and punitive measures against human trafficking and sex trafficking in 2017, North Korea denied such concerns by saying, \u201cHuman trafficking is inconceivable in the DPRK.\u201d<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn24\" id=\"_ftnref24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a> This statement directly runs counter to the fact that sex trafficking is rampant and commercialized in places like <em>jangmadang<\/em> (informal markets in North Korea), especially since the severe famine in the 1990s.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn25\" id=\"_ftnref25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, Pyongyang often dismisses the annual resolutions issued by the UN General Assembly that condemn its human rights abuses and insists they are political plots to topple its <em>juche<\/em>-based socialist regime.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn26\" id=\"_ftnref26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a> More broadly, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il have often denounced the Western ideas of humanitarianism, framing them as \u201chypocritical ideas concocted by the capitalist class in order to paralyze the working class.\u201d<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn27\" id=\"_ftnref27\"><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/a> Taken together, North Korea tries to defend its state ideologies and reputation by dismissing these criticisms as false or politically motivated.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>To further uphold its image against the criticisms, the DPRK also accuses the UN and its member states of committing human rights violations and infringing upon its rights to national sovereignty. For instance, in light of the anti-racism protests in the United States starting in 2020, North Korea has castigated the U.S. for violating human rights, trying to delegitimize the U.S. authority to condemn its human rights abuses.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn28\" id=\"_ftnref28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, the DPRK has frequently objected to the resolutions put forth by the UN Commission on Human Rights, such as Resolution 1997\/3, \u201cSituation of Human Rights in the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea,\u201d claiming that the UN clearly violated its sovereignty.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn29\" id=\"_ftnref29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a> In fact, North Korea uses these allegations and the logic of <em>Urisik Ingwollon<\/em> (our style of human rights) to justify its non-compliance with the UN resolutions.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn30\" id=\"_ftnref30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a> According to its collectivist ideologies, individuals\u2019 human rights cannot exist apart from national sovereignty, nor can there be natural rights that apply universally to all countries; based on this understanding, North Korea stresses its need to strengthen its military via <em>songun <\/em>(military-first) policies to protect national sovereignty and human rights of its own definition, while blaming the international community for infringing on its sovereignty by raising universal human rights issues.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn31\" id=\"_ftnref31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a> Pyongyang firmly maintains this stance in its official statements to the UN and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) sessions, asserting that the politicized, double standards of the UN Human Rights Council present major obstacles to its promotion of human rights.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn32\" id=\"_ftnref32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a> All these counter-accusations are part of North Korea\u2019s attempt to undermine the legitimacy of other states or organizations that criticize its human rights abuses and damage its reputation.<\/p>\n<p>Lastly, while North Korea often rejects international criticism, there are times when it complies with the requests made by the UN due to intense international pressure and its economic concerns tied to image management. The DPRK has selectively adopted international human rights norms by amending its domestic laws. In 1998, the North Korean government added a clause that guarantees the freedom of residence and travel in Article 75 of its national constitution after the UN Sub-commission on Human Rights requested North Korea in 1997 to ensure the freedom of movement.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn33\" id=\"_ftnref33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, in 2010, Pyongyang established the Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Women (LPPRW) to enforce the CEDAW and specify the preceding regulations in response to the criticisms and suggestions by the women\u2019s organizations within the UN.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn34\" id=\"_ftnref34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Besides the international pressure, some of North Korea\u2019s accepting responses might have been motivated by its need for foreign investments and economic cooperation since the conditions for such transactions often require respect for human rights.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn35\" id=\"_ftnref35\"><sup>[35]<\/sup><\/a> This becomes more evident when considering China\u2019s legal modifications regarding human rights during its market reform and their impact on North Korea. For instance, Beijing amended its constitution in 2004 to include human rights-related laws as part of its economic reform of opening up to foreign markets, the example of which influenced Pyongyang to revise its constitution in 2009 by stipulating Article 8 to protect the rights of laborers.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn36\" id=\"_ftnref36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a> Like China\u2019s case, the DPRK often attempts to create a conducive environment for international investments by changing its domestic laws according to the international demands for human rights protection.<\/p>\n<p>While North Korea\u2019s complex response to international criticism is dependent on various factors and difficult to categorize narrowly, its overall patterns could be understood as a mix of reputational defense based on its already-existing laws, denial of and counter-accusations to the criticisms, and partial adoption of the UN resolutions. In these three kinds of behavior, the DPRK consistently shows its sensitivity to international censure and efforts to bolster its image on the international stage. This leads to several questions: what is North Korea ultimately trying to achieve through defending its reputation? How does its interest in image management explain the discrepancy between its rhetoric on women\u2019s empowerment and the reality of the plight of North Korean women?<\/p>\n<p>North Korea became a state party to some of the UN human rights treaties even before South Korea did, but its ratifications were most likely made with the political aim of distinguishing itself from South Korea, which was then under authoritarian leadership, rather than actively safeguarding human rights.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn37\" id=\"_ftnref37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a> It is also possible that the DPRK submitted national reports on the implementation of these treaties to pacify international criticism and propagate its external image of upholding human rights, including women\u2019s rights.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn38\" id=\"_ftnref38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a> Additionally, aspiring for international prestige, North Korea, under leader Kim Jong-un, has sent various women\u2019s delegations to Europe and East Asia to follow the global trends or the \u201crhythms of globalization,\u201d albeit far limited in actual influence over women staying in North Korea.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn39\" id=\"_ftnref39\"><sup>[39]<\/sup><\/a> In sum, the DPRK holds an interest in promoting women\u2019s rights with objectives such as building its reputation in the context of inter-Korean competition,<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn40\" id=\"_ftnref40\"><sup>[40]<\/sup><\/a> mitigating international censure over its human rights abuses, and cultivating a positive image for international investments. Since the North Korean regime is only concerned with image management regarding gender equality, the majority of its policies for women go unkept,<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn41\" id=\"_ftnref41\"><sup>[41]<\/sup><\/a> lacking practical measures for implementation.<\/p>\n<p>This hypothesis of reputational defense, however, fails to account for several exceptions or confounding variables. While the DPRK tries to defend its reputation by either acknowledging or dismissing international criticism, it is questionable whether its offensive counter-accusations help with image management because they present an unfavorable image of North Korea to the countries targeted for its accusations. In other words, since Pyongyang\u2019s efforts to bolster its image via counter-accusations also come with reputational costs, this explanation seems self-contradictory. It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that the DPRK\u2019s struggle for legitimacy is the main underlying factor behind its diverse responses to international censure. Furthermore, the hypothesis does not exclusively address the North Korean women\u2019s rights but rather the human rights issues as a whole. Thus, it remains unanswered why the Kim regime specifically emphasizes the role of women in society.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Explanation Two: Labor Mobilization<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>While the previous explanation on reputational defense examines North Korea\u2019s rhetoric on women empowerment toward the international audience, the hypothesis concerning labor mobilization analyzes how such rhetoric is directed toward its domestic audience, namely North Korean women. In launching various campaigns and instituting laws for gender equality, the DPRK essentially uses its rhetoric on women\u2019s rights to justify its mass mobilization of women\u2019s labor for building a prosperous socialist economy. The Kim regime\u2019s veiled interest in the economic value of the women\u2019s workforce accounts for the wide gap between its policies and the difficulties North Korean women face in their daily lives.<\/p>\n<p>The DPRK\u2019s political and legal emphasis on gender equality derives its source from the communist ideologies previously set forth and practiced by the Soviet Union and China. According to the socialist theories articulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, when it comes to the struggle for gender equality, it is more complicated to apply the theories of class struggle due to men\u2019s deep biases towards women; they thus propose that women seek their liberation through participating in the society\u2019s labor and production.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn42\" id=\"_ftnref42\"><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/a> Based on this ideological logic, the Soviet Union and China have extensively mobilized women in their industries according to their economic planning, which then set the roadmap for North Korea to follow.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn43\" id=\"_ftnref43\"><sup>[43]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>In the early stages of North Korea as a new nation, Kim Il-sung explicitly stated two reasons for supporting women\u2019s organizations: to unite women in contributing to nation-building efforts and to realize social emancipation via implementing government policies.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn44\" id=\"_ftnref44\"><sup>[44]<\/sup><\/a> In line with these goals, Pyongyang established the Democratic Women\u2019s Union of North Korea in 1945 to direct women\u2019s political and economic activities within the state\u2019s socialist movements rather than to address the needs of and challenges faced by women.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn45\" id=\"_ftnref45\"><sup>[45]<\/sup><\/a> The Kim regime\u2019s goal of mobilizing women\u2019s labor is clearly articulated in Kim Il-sung\u2019s speech at the Fourth Congress of the Women\u2019s Union in 1971, where he stated that women should not be buried in family life upon graduation but should instead work longer for the party and socialist revolutions, even if their marriage may be delayed.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn46\" id=\"_ftnref46\"><sup>[46]<\/sup><\/a> His speech reveals the extent to which the North Korean government sought to mobilize the female workforce in its socialist reforms, even as women composed half of its population. Moreover, in order to guarantee women\u2019s full participation in the five-year economic plan, North Korea began to provide social services and wage \u201can all-out assault on former \u201cbackward lifestyles\u201d (<em>staryi byt\u2019<\/em>), targeting sexual exploitation and physical abuse of women and children.\u201d<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn47\" id=\"_ftnref47\"><sup>[47]<\/sup><\/a> At the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers\u2019 Party (KWP) in 1972, Kim Il-sung also declared that women would be liberated from heavy household duties so as to secure their availability to work at state-run factories and agricultural operations.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn48\" id=\"_ftnref48\"><sup>[48]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>It was under these economic objectives that North Korea initially drafted and even enforced policies for women\u2019s rights. Against this background, the DPRK\u2019s formulation and implementation of women\u2019s policies began to unfold and change over different periods, shaping North Korean women\u2019s socioeconomic roles and lifestyles. Table 1 below provides a simplified overview of the changes in the DPRK\u2019s women-oriented policies and laws, as well as the Women\u2019s Union\u2019s activities across the five time periods.<\/p>\n<p>The overall developments in Table 1 reveal that North Korea has set up many laws and reforms to consistently mobilize women\u2019s labor. First, to specify the types of women\u2019s labor in addition to the Women\u2019s Union\u2019s activities listed above, the North Korean state launched various mobilization campaigns: the Campaign to Win the Tree Revolution Red Flag, Shock Troops Recovery Campaign, Cheongsan-ri Campaign, Chollima Movement, the Daesan Enterprise Management System, and the 1980s Speed Creation Movement.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn49\" id=\"_ftnref49\"><sup>[49]<\/sup><\/a> Most of these movements were organized to elicit more significant participation in the state-run operations. To elaborate, as part of the state-led organizational life, North Korean women were obligated to work in diverse sectors, such as rural agricultural labor, railroad construction, maintenance of historical sites, administrative work for public offices or <em>inminban <\/em>(neighborhood watch units), and provision of supplies to the Korean People\u2019s Army (KPA).<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn50\" id=\"_ftnref50\"><sup>[50]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>With the aim of mobilizing women in these various sectors, North Korea promotes its rhetoric and laws for gender equality to forge identities or concepts of \u201cfemale revolutionaries\u201d and \u201cwomen\u2019s liberation.\u201d<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn51\" id=\"_ftnref51\"><sup>[51]<\/sup><\/a> As shown in Table 1, the establishment of laws regarding the recruitment of female workers and the working hours of working mothers correlates with the increased mobilization of women\u2019s labor, especially in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th time periods. All these legal provisions and campaigns project women\u2019s identity as indispensable workers, reinforcing their sense of need to work hard for the North Korean state. This can be compared with the concept of <em>dagongmei <\/em>(the working daughter) in contemporary China, which serves as a sense of identity or a tool of \u201cself-subjectivization\u201d for young rural girls working at global factories that rely on their labor to generate private and transnational capital.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn52\" id=\"_ftnref52\"><sup>[52]<\/sup><\/a> Similarly, the DPRK\u2019s promotion of women\u2019s rights and social roles \u201cforcefully weave[s] the people into a North Korean state that posits itself as protector and provider\u201d that the clear dissonance between reality and rhetoric does not \u201cforce a fundamental rethinking of the individual\u2019s place within the society and culture.\u201d<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn53\" id=\"_ftnref53\"><sup>[53]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Another observable trend in Table 1 is the increasing prioritization of women\u2019s domestic role as housewives, especially over the 4th and 5th time periods. After the severe famine and economic recessions in the 1990s, also known as the Arduous March, the Kim regime emphasized women\u2019s housekeeping duties. North Korean women, however, also had to work for the state\u2019s operations and participate in informal market activities for survival, which resulted in their double or triple burdens of work.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn54\" id=\"_ftnref54\"><sup>[54]<\/sup><\/a> The socialist gender equality policy of the 1980s, therefore, regressed by strengthening the traditional roles and patriarchal structure of North Korean families; such shifts in the women\u2019s policies became evident during difficult times such as the Arduous March, the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, and a series of natural disasters which forced women to return to their domestic duties.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn55\" id=\"_ftnref55\"><sup>[55]<\/sup><\/a> Additionally, the wage gap between men and women widened when Pyongyang implemented the Economic Management Improvement Measures in 2002 to raise wages for the heavy and chemical sectors while relegating women to light industries and service sectors with the lowest average wages.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn56\" id=\"_ftnref56\"><sup>[56]<\/sup><\/a> Since North Korea\u2019s rhetoric on women\u2019s empowerment initially hinged upon its need for economic development rather than for actual improvements, it is unsurprising that the DPRK would revise or disregard its previous policies of gender equality upon changed circumstances such as the economic crises.<\/p>\n<p>During and after the economic recessions of the 1990s, however, due to the DPRK\u2019s failed food distribution system and lack of protection for women\u2019s rights, North Korean women were tasked with multiple burdens which profoundly changed the family dynamics and were also left more vulnerable to perpetrators of human rights. Since North Korean men were bound to their official jobs for the state with little to no pay,<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn57\" id=\"_ftnref57\"><sup>[57]<\/sup><\/a> their wives had to lift their families off the ground for literal survival. Ordinary North Korean women usually work from dawn to dusk at informal markets such as <em>jangmadang<\/em> to secure food and basic needs.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn58\" id=\"_ftnref58\"><sup>[58]<\/sup><\/a> In fact, women\u2019s market activities mostly sustain their families, even as informal commerce accounts for over 70 percent of total household income in North Korea.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn59\" id=\"_ftnref59\"><sup>[59]<\/sup><\/a> To further provide for their families, many North Korean women engage in cross-border trades near China and often leave permanently, with estimates showing that around 70 percent of North Korean refugees residing in China are women.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn60\" id=\"_ftnref60\"><sup>[60]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>While the North Korean government tolerates these informal market activities to an extent, the illegality of such activities still leaves North Korean women physically vulnerable to exploitation by the market officials, who are mostly men.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn61\" id=\"_ftnref61\"><sup>[61]<\/sup><\/a> During the periods of \u201cstrict supervision,\u201d some women have traveled miles through the hills on foot to avoid being caught.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn62\" id=\"_ftnref62\"><sup>[62]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, North Korean women involved in cross-border trades near the Chinese border are highly vulnerable to sex trafficking, kidnapping, cybersex industries, and forced marriages.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn63\" id=\"_ftnref63\"><sup>[63]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, it is equally, if not more, devastating for them to be repatriated back to the DPRK since they are often sent to detention centers where they face severe mistreatment and harassment.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn64\" id=\"_ftnref64\"><sup>[64]<\/sup><\/a> Such flagrant violations of women\u2019s rights sharply contrast with Pyongyang\u2019s rhetoric on women\u2019s empowerment, which was mostly stated for the purposes of labor mobilization.<\/p>\n<p>Besides women\u2019s role as workers for their country and breadwinners for their families, North Korean women were also burdened with heavy domestic duties. In light of these changes in women\u2019s circumstances, the Kim regime has begun promoting images of motherhood and role models such as Kim Jong-suk and Kang Pan-sok, as mentioned in Table 1. Kim Jong-suk, the wife of Kim Il-sung, has often been hailed in North Korean textbooks as \u201cthe mother of the revolution\u201d and a well-rounded female hero with multiple accomplishments such as fighting the anti-Japanese wars, gathering military information at underground organizations, doing household chores for her husband, and educating her son Kim Jong-il.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn65\" id=\"_ftnref65\"><sup>[65]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, in 2014, upon the 68th anniversary of the Law of Sex Equality (1946), Kim Jong-un emphasized the need for women to live \u201cthe life of a pioneer and a superwoman\u201d who excels in both domestic and social labor.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn66\" id=\"_ftnref66\"><sup>[66]<\/sup><\/a> North Korea\u2019s images of ideal motherhood and womanhood thus attempt to brainwash North Korean women to fulfill their obligations to both their families and their nation. As the Kim regime imposes such ideals upon women along with other efforts of indoctrination, many North Korean women are largely uncritical or even unaware of the reality of their double burden and the unimplemented policies for women\u2019s rights.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn67\" id=\"_ftnref67\"><sup>[67]<\/sup><\/a> However, more recent trends reveal that North Korean women are becoming exhausted with multiple burdens and no longer want to have children.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn68\" id=\"_ftnref68\"><sup>[68]<\/sup><\/a> All these findings only go to show that the Kim regime\u2019s interest in exploiting women\u2019s labor lies underneath its disguised rhetoric on women\u2019s rights, resulting in the wide gap between the stated policy and reality.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Comparative Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The two competing explanations can be weighed against each other when examining both the confirming and disconfirming evidence corresponding to each theoretical explanation. First, regarding North Korea\u2019s reputational defense, there exist exceptions where evidence does not support the hypothesis. As previously argued, it is unclear if the DPRK\u2019s various responses to international criticism are all caused by its efforts for external image control. In fact, research on North Korea\u2019s rhetoric suggests that Pyongyang signals messages toward its domestic audience more frequently than toward the international audience since the latter entails more risks or costs of reputation.<a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftnref69\" href=\"#_ftn69\"><sup>[69]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, it is difficult to pin down North Korea\u2019s intentions for addressing the UN human rights resolutions since the state\u2019s responses are interspersed with selective concessions and dismissals.<a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftnref70\" href=\"#_ftn70\"><sup>[70]<\/sup><\/a>It is also uncertain whether the DPRK\u2019s declarations and policies on women\u2019s rights are directly connected to image management. Regardless of Pyongyang\u2019s rhetoric, international observers are well aware of North Korea\u2019s blatant violations of women\u2019s rights through the reports by the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI), interviews with North Korean defectors conducted by human rights organizations, satellite imagery,<a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftnref71\" href=\"#_ftn71\"><sup>[71]<\/sup><\/a> and other data points. Given the level of their understanding, the claim that North Korea presents these women-oriented statements and laws for reputational defense, therefore, seems weak since the state\u2019s rhetoric could easily be disproven.<a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftnref72\" href=\"#_ftn72\"><sup>[72]<\/sup><\/a> It is much less clear what the DPRK tries to achieve by promoting women\u2019s rights, not just human rights.<\/p>\n<p>The second explanation of labor mobilization, on the other hand, may offer more accurate insights into the articulation of North Korea\u2019s political statements and laws regarding women. While this argument is not without exceptions, it provides a more fundamental understanding of how North Korea perceives and promotes women\u2019s rights, along with clear empirical support and consistent patterns across different time periods. While the first hypothesis of reputational defense partly rests on assumptions and correlation between the UN reports and the DPRK\u2019s domestic legislation, the second argument presents the North Korean leaders\u2019 statements explicitly mentioning the state\u2019s goals of mobilizing women\u2019s labor. Such objectives for labor mobilization are also reflected in the increase of North Korean women\u2019s labor force participation in the late 1990s, as quantified by the International Labor Organization (ILO).<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn73\" id=\"_ftnref73\"><sup>[73]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the trends of Pyongyang\u2019s rhetoric reveals that the state\u2019s mobilization of women underlies its declarations and policies of gender equality. According to a study of the DPRK\u2019s women discourse in <em>Rodong Sinmun, <\/em>an official North Korean newspaper, from 1998 to 2007, the Kim regime continuously highlighted women\u2019s role in labor and protection for the <em>Suryeong<\/em> (the supreme leader of North Korea), without reflecting the significant changes in women\u2019s socioeconomic status and perspectives since the Arduous March.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn74\" id=\"_ftnref74\"><sup>[74]<\/sup><\/a> Such findings could be attributed to the regime\u2019s view of women as subjects that must perform all kinds of duties for the state.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn75\" id=\"_ftnref75\"><sup>[75]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>However, there are flaws in the logic outlined in the second explanation. The argument posits the DPRK\u2019s predominant focus on mobilizing women\u2019s labor as an explanation for the state\u2019s puzzling rhetoric on women\u2019s empowerment despite its egregious violations of women\u2019s rights. However, some North Korean analysts observe that women\u2019s increased economic participation has rather reinforced their social identity or status. For instance, women who garnered extensive experience at marketplaces have cultivated \u201ca strong sense of identity\u201d and have become \u201cactive in demanding separations or divorces.\u201d<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn76\" id=\"_ftnref76\"><sup>[76]<\/sup><\/a> Furthermore, due to the rise of the grassroots market economy and women\u2019s increased participation in the market, North Korean women were endowed with \u201cprivileged access to more profitable kinds of economic activities.\u201d<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn77\" id=\"_ftnref77\"><sup>[77]<\/sup><\/a> Such observations could imply that the gap between North Korea\u2019s rhetoric and the reality of women\u2019s rights is gradually narrowing precisely because of labor mobilization.<\/p>\n<p>While these recent developments do disconfirm the second explanation in part, nonetheless, the analysis of the Kim regime\u2019s exploitation of women\u2019s labor seems more plausible than other explanations for the aforementioned gap. While the DPRK initially established women-oriented policies to increase women\u2019s social and economic participation, it has done so mostly to utilize their workforce rather than to liberate them from the gender struggle, as its ideologies suggest.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn78\" id=\"_ftnref78\"><sup>[78]<\/sup><\/a> The fact that North Korea later encouraged women to take on more traditional roles despite its previous promises of freeing them from housekeeping duties confirms that the Kim regime is primarily motivated by its political interests. The North Korean government continues its feudal-patriarchal system at the national level, and the Confucian norms of patriarchy are still deeply entrenched in North Korea\u2019s leadership and society as a whole, governing their fundamental views and treatment toward women.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn79\" id=\"_ftnref79\"><sup>[79]<\/sup><\/a> One of the clearest examples of the discrepancy between rhetoric and reality is the double or triple burden that North Korean women have to bear, and this can only be explained by the DPRK\u2019s focus on labor mobilization and lack of genuine interest in addressing the harmful norms and practices toward women. The COVID-19 pandemic further unveils the Kim regime\u2019s disinterest in the conditions of North Korean women as its draconian border lockdowns restrict their market activities and subjugate them to even more exploitation by the state.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn80\" id=\"_ftnref80\"><sup>[80]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>In summation, based on the comparative analysis of the two arguments, this paper concludes that the second explanation of labor mobilization is more plausible. Whereas the first hypothesis yields varying outcomes depending on different types of North Korea\u2019s response to international criticism, the second argument fits North Korea\u2019s political ideology and has more consistent empirical support specifically tied to the DPRK\u2019s women-oriented laws.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Based on such analysis, North Korea\u2019s aim of mobilizing the female workforce explains the regime\u2019s puzzling interest in women\u2019s issues. This conclusion entails significant implications because shedding light on the Kim regime\u2019s motivations could be helpful in finding more effective ways that foreign governments, the UN, and NGOs can guide, pressure, or incentivize the regime toward improving conditions for women. The findings of the second explanation of labor mobilization highlight the need to empower North Korean women by improving their economic opportunities and raising their awareness of international human rights norms.<\/p>\n<p>Given how the increased economic activities of North Korean women have partly improved their social status, encouraging the DPRK to lead economic reforms or even mobilization initiatives for women along with educational programs on women\u2019s rights could be a creative strategy to better their conditions. For example, some scholars recommend that foreign embassies in North Korea launch outreach programs that promote safer labor standards for North Korean women, as well as organize UN-sponsored seminars for Chinese and North Korean officials to address issues of sex trafficking.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn81\" id=\"_ftnref81\"><sup>[81]<\/sup><\/a> While the possibility of holding such events is contingent upon the ongoing pandemic, it would still be useful to start planning ahead or even consider hosting virtual conferences that could expose North Korean women to the international norms of women\u2019s rights. The U.S. and South Korea can also push for more vigorous efforts to provide international information to North Korean citizens via radio broadcasting.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn82\" id=\"_ftnref82\"><sup>[82]<\/sup><\/a> It would also be helpful for the South Korean government further to prioritize the issue of North Korean human rights and continue humanitarian efforts such as family reunions.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn83\" id=\"_ftnref83\"><sup>[83]<\/sup><\/a> Additionally, NGOs can look into ways to empower female entrepreneurs in the DPRK by providing technical equipment and training programs in the fields of science and engineering.<a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftn84\" id=\"_ftnref84\"><sup>[84]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>The plight of North Korean women is more than evident in the Kim regime\u2019s exploitation of their labor and lack of protection for their rights despite its rhetoric. With a better understanding of the regime\u2019s motivations, however, it may be possible for international organizations and foreign governments to take concrete steps toward reaching North Korean women via economic and educational programs and help improve their conditions.<\/p>\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n<p><strong>Table 1. Historical Overview of North Korea\u2019s Women\u2019s Policies<\/strong>. This table was organized by combining charts and analyses from various sources. For the first column on North Korea\u2019s policies for women, see Sooah Lee, \u201cBukhan-yeoseong Jeongchaeg-ui Byeonhwa: Gabujangjeog\u201d. <\/p>\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\">\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Focus areas<\/strong> <strong>Periods<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Women\u2019s Policies<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Women-related Legislation<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Democratic Women\u2019s Union of North Korea<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>1) The Anti- Imperialist, Anti- Feudal Democratic Revolution (1945-1946)<\/td>\n<td>Efforts to advance women\u2019s economic and sociopolitical status\u00a0<\/td>\n<td>The Law of Sex Equality (July 30th, 1946)<br \/>The Labor Law for Laborers and Office Workers (July 1947)<\/td>\n<td rowspan=\"3\">\u2013 Mobilizing women for the construction of a socialist state<br \/>\u2013 Laying a foundation for women\u2019s participation in production sectors<br \/>\u2013 Launching initiatives for eradicating illiteracy and educating about state ideologies\u00a0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2) Preparing for the Socialist Revolution (1947-1950)<\/td>\n<td>Women\u2019s participation in the construction of a socialist economy and the establishment of the Women\u2019s Union<\/td>\n<td>Regulations for the <em>tagaso <\/em>(nurseries or daycare centers) (December 23rd, 1948)<br \/>Regulations for the <em>sanwon <\/em>(maternity hospitals) (October 28th, 1949)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>3) The War and Postwar Recovery (1950-1960)<\/td>\n<td>The mobilization of women\u2019s labor and the promotion of their economic independence\u00a0<\/td>\n<td>The directive concerning the divorce procedure (March 8th, 1956)<br \/>The directive regarding the recruitment of women in each sector of the people\u2019s economy (July 1956)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>4) The Construction of Socialism (1961-1971)<\/td>\n<td>Women\u2019s housekeeping duties as mothers and\u00a0social laborers\u00a0<\/td>\n<td>Regulations on the Working Hours of Working Mothers (September 27th, 1966)<br \/>The directive of strengthening the material foundation of <em>tagaso <\/em>and kindergartens (July 3rd, 1971)\u00a0<\/td>\n<td rowspan=\"2\">Socialist Revolutionization of Women (1965-1982):\u00a0<br \/>\u2013 Revolutionizing women and families and instituting the class line<br \/>\u2013 Organizing classes on the <em>juche <\/em>ideology and Lady Kang Pan-sok (Kim Il-sung\u2019s mother) to encourage women\u2019s dedication to labor and spirit of collectivism <\/p>\n<p>Transition to the Era of Kim Jong-il (1983-1997): <br \/>\u2013 Mobilizing and managing women\u2019s workforce amidst the exacerbated economic situation \u00a0 <\/p>\n<p>The Realization of Songun Politics (1998-): <br \/>\u2013 Realizing the goals of \u2018gunstock families\u2019 and \u2018motherhood heroes\u2019<br \/>\u2013 Emphasizing women\u2019s traditional role of bearing, raising, and educating many children<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>5) The Development of Socialism (1972-)<\/td>\n<td>Integration of the <em>juche <\/em>ideology into the policies and the revolutionization of three areas of women\u2019s labor\u00a0\u00a0<\/td>\n<td>The DPRK Inheritance Act (March 13th, 2002)<br \/>The DPRK Criminal Act: Regulations on the Punishment of\u00a0Prostitution (April 29th, 2004)<br \/>The DPRK Women\u2019s Rights Act (December 22nd, 2010)\u00a0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/figure>\n<p><strong>Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn1\" href=\"#_ftnref1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) defines \u201cwomen\u2019s rights\u201d as the right of women to be free from gender discrimination and to have equal access and opportunities in terms of political participation, public life, education, employment, and health. See <em>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, <\/em>New York: United Nations, 1979, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/Documents\/ProfessionalInterest\/cedaw.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/Documents\/ProfessionalInterest\/cedaw.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn2\" href=\"#_ftnref2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> The Joguk Kwangbok Association or \u201cAssociation for the Korean Liberation\u201d was established by Kim Il-sung in 1936 as the first Korean organization to promote the anti-Japanese unification front during the Japanese colonial rule. Kim drafted the Ten Codes for the association, the 7th of which mentions the need for gender equality. After the Korean liberation in 1945, the codes played an essential role in North Korea\u2019s development of political lines and communist revolution towards the embodiment of Kim\u2019s <em>juche <\/em>(self-reliance) ideologies. See Dong-ahn Yang, \u201c\uc870\uad6d\uad11\ubcf5\ud68c(\u7956\u570b\u5149\u5fa9\u6703),\u201d \ud55c\uad6d\ubbfc\uc871\ubb38\ud654\ub300\ubc31\uacfc\uc0ac\uc804 (Encyclopedia of Korean Culture), Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"http:\/\/encykorea.aks.ac.kr\/Contents\/Item\/E0066737\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">http:\/\/encykorea.aks.ac.kr\/Contents\/Item\/E0066737<\/a>. For more historical details, see also Mi-ryang Yoon, <em>Bukhan-ui Yeoseongjeongchaeg <\/em>\ubd81\ud55c\uc758 \uc5ec\uc131\uc815\ucc45 [North Korea\u2019s Women Policy]<em> <\/em>(Seoul: Hanul, 1991), 58-64.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn3\" href=\"#_ftnref3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> Cited in Darcie Draudt, \u201cCo-opting the Narrative: How Changing Women\u2019s Roles Provide Legitimacy to Kim Jong Un,\u201d<em>38 North, <\/em>July 30, 2020, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.38north.org\/2020\/07\/ddraudt073020\/\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.38north.org\/2020\/07\/ddraudt073020\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn4\" href=\"#_ftnref4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> According to the interview of the former professional North Korean woman, the administrative body under Kim Jong-un directed that 30% of the high-ranking positions, such as heads of institutions, secretaries, and other officials, be filled by women. In the Kim Jong-un era, there have also been many policies on women such as the extension of maternity leave in the Socialist Labor Law. See Jeong-ah Cho, Ji Sun Yee, and Hee Young Yi, <em>Daily Lives of North Korean Women and Gender Politics<\/em> (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2020): 15-16, 31-32, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.kinu.or.kr\/www\/jsp\/prg\/api\/dlVE.jsp?menuIdx=646&amp;category=73&amp;thisPage=1&amp;searchField=&amp;searchText=&amp;biblioId=1538418\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.kinu.or.kr\/www\/jsp\/prg\/api\/dlVE.jsp?menuIdx=646&amp;category=73&amp;thisPage=1&amp;searchField=&amp;searchText=&amp;biblioId=1538418<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn5\" href=\"#_ftnref5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a> Jina Yang, \u201cWomen\u2019s Rights in the DPRK: Discrepancies Between International and Domestic Legal Instruments in Promoting Women\u2019s Rights and the Reality Reflected by North Korean Defectors,\u201d <em>Cornell International Law Journal<\/em> 51, no. 1 (2018): 223-225, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/scholarship.law.cornell.edu\/cilj\/vol51\/iss1\/6\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/scholarship.law.cornell.edu\/cilj\/vol51\/iss1\/6<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref6\" id=\"_ftn6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a> Yang, \u201cWomen\u2019s Rights in the DPRK,\u201d 224.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn7\" href=\"#_ftnref7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a> Sea Young Kim and Leif-Eric Easley, \u201cThe Neglected North Korean Crisis: Women\u2019s Rights,\u201d <em>Ethics &amp; International Affairs<\/em> 35, no. 1 (2021): 22, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/S0892679421000010\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/S0892679421000010<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref8\" id=\"_ftn8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a> For North Korean defectors\u2019 testimonies, see David Hawk, <em>The Hidden Gulag: The Lives and Voices of \u201cThose Who are Sent to the Mountains\u201d<\/em> (Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012).<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn9\" href=\"#_ftnref9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, <em>2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea, <\/em>U.S. Department of State, 2021, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.state.gov\/reports\/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices\/north-korea\/\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.state.gov\/reports\/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices\/north-korea\/<\/a> (accessed Jan 24, 2021). Forced infanticide is common at holding centers (<em>jipkyulso)<\/em> in North Korea. For more details, see also Jinwook Choi, <em>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2016<\/em> (Seoul: Korea Institute of National Unification, 2016): 118.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn10\" href=\"#_ftnref10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a> Won-hong Kim, \u201cWomen of North Korea: A closer look at everyday life,\u201d Ministry of Unification, Institute for Unification Education (2014): 20, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.kinu.or.kr\/brd\/board\/726\/L\/menu\/382?brdType=R&amp;thisPage=21&amp;bbIdx=57160&amp;searchField=&amp;searchText=\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.kinu.or.kr\/brd\/board\/726\/L\/menu\/382?brdType=R&amp;thisPage=21&amp;bbIdx=57160&amp;searchField=&amp;searchText=<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref11\" id=\"_ftn11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a> Yang, \u201cWomen\u2019s Rights in the DPRK,\u201d 233-234.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref12\" id=\"_ftn12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a> Kim, \u201cWomen of North Korea,\u201d 57.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref13\" id=\"_ftn13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a> Research on \u2018naming and shaming\u2019 finds that autocracies tend to be more sensitive to international shaming than democracies and hybrid regimes do. See Cullen S. Hendrix and Wendy H. Wong, \u201cWhen Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses,\u201d <em>British Journal of Political Science<\/em> 43, no. 3 (2013): 651-672, doi:10.1017\/S0007123412000488.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref14\" id=\"_ftn14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, <em>North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options, <\/em>by Rhoda Margesson, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Andorra Bruno, RL34189 (2007), 30.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref15\" id=\"_ftn15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a> Alexander Dukalskis, <em>Making the World Safe for Dictatorship<\/em> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 162.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref16\" id=\"_ftn16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a> These gymnastic trainers helped these states organize the Mass Games in a North Korean style. See Dukalskis, <em>Making the World Safe for Dictatorship<\/em>, 162.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref17\" id=\"_ftn17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a> Dukalskis notes that while these friendship groups do not change international discourse significantly, still their pro-North Korean statements could be found in times when the country faces international criticisms over its nuclear weapons tests. See Dukalskis, <em>Making the World Safe for Dictatorship<\/em>, 178-181.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref18\" id=\"_ftn18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a> One way Chongryon has promoted propaganda was by juxtaposing their conditions with that of Japan, pointing to low employment prospects, limitations to political rights, and the lack of support by the Japanese government. See Dukalskis, <em>Making the World Safe for Dictatorship<\/em>, 169.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn19\" href=\"#_ftnref19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cRatification Status for Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea,\u201d Treaty Body Database, accessed January 28, 2022, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/tbinternet.ohchr.org\/_layouts\/15\/TreatyBodyExternal\/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=47&amp;Lang=EN\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/tbinternet.ohchr.org\/_layouts\/15\/TreatyBodyExternal\/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=47&amp;Lang=EN<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref20\" id=\"_ftn20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a> Jae Chun Won and So Young Park, \u201cNorth Korean Women\u2019s Rights in contexts of UN CEDAW and its implementation in North Korea,\u201d <em>Kangwon Law Review <\/em>61, (2020): 262, doi: 10.18215\/kwlr.2020.61..253.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref21\" id=\"_ftn21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a> Yang, \u201cWomen\u2019s Rights in the DPRK,\u201d 241.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref22\" id=\"_ftn22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a> Yang, \u201cWomen\u2019s Rights in the DPRK,\u201d 241. The paper cites the interview with the former staff of North Korea\u2019s foreign affairs department. Some experts also consider the possibility that it might have been created just for submission of the CEDAW reports in 2016. See Daye Gang and Joanna Hosaniak, <em>\u201cThey only claim that things have changed\u2026\u201d Discrimination against women in the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea <\/em>(Seoul: Citizens\u2019 Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), 2018), 14.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn23\" href=\"#_ftnref23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a> Ben Willis, \u201cScrutinizing North Korea\u2019s Record on Civil and Political rights: The New ICCPR Reporting Cycle,\u201d <em>38 North<\/em>. September 2, 2021. <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.38north.org\/2021\/09\/scrutinizing-north-koreas-record-on-civil-and-political-rights-the-new-iccpr-reporting-cycle\/\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.38north.org\/2021\/09\/scrutinizing-north-koreas-record-on-civil-and-political-rights-the-new-iccpr-reporting-cycle\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn24\" href=\"#_ftnref24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a> United Nations, CEDAW, <em>List of issues and questions in relation to the combined second to fourth periodic reports of the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea, <\/em>CEDAW\/C\/PRK\/Q\/2-4\/Add. 1 (5 July 2017), para 43., available from <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/1293825?ln=en\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/1293825?ln=en<\/a>., cited in Won and Park, \u201cNorth Korean Women\u2019s Rights in contexts of UN CEDAW and its implementation in North Korea,\u201d 265.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn25\" href=\"#_ftnref25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a> Young-Hee Shim, \u201cHuman Rights of women in North Korea: Present State and Factors,\u201d <em>The Journal of Asian Women <\/em>45, no. 2 (2006): 169, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dbpia.co.kr\/journal\/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE01107471\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">http:\/\/www.dbpia.co.kr\/journal\/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE01107471<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn26\" href=\"#_ftnref26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a> Gregory Ulferts and Terry L. Howard, \u201cNorth Korean Human Rights Abuses and Their Consequences.\u201d <em>North Korean Review<\/em> 13, no. 2 (2017): 85, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/26396124\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/26396124<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn27\" href=\"#_ftnref27\"><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/a> Jang Yop Hwang, \u201cThe Problems of Human Rights in North Korea,\u201d <em>Columbia Law, <\/em>accessed December 14, 2021, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"http:\/\/www2.law.columbia.edu\/course_00S_L9436_001\/North%20Korea%20materials\/hwang%20jang3.html\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">http:\/\/www2.law.columbia.edu\/course_00S_L9436_001\/North%20Korea%20materials\/hwang%20jang3.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn28\" href=\"#_ftnref28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a> Edward Howell, \u201cNorth Korea Is Watching the US Anti-Racism Protests,\u201d<em> The Diplomat<\/em>, June 5, 2020, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2020\/06\/north-korea-is-watching-the-us-anti-racism-protests\/\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2020\/06\/north-korea-is-watching-the-us-anti-racism-protests\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn29\" href=\"#_ftnref29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a> Kyung-Bae Min, \u201cThe Viewpoints and Responses of North Korea toward UN Human Rights Law,\u201d <em>Inha Law Review: The Institute of Legal Studies Inha University <\/em>17, no. 1 (2014): 115, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dbpia.co.kr\/journal\/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE02413402\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">http:\/\/www.dbpia.co.kr\/journal\/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE02413402<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref30\" id=\"_ftn30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a> Min, \u201cThe Viewpoints and Responses of North Korea,\u201d 118-120.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref31\" id=\"_ftn31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a> Min, \u201cThe Viewpoints and Responses of North Korea,\u201d 119.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn32\" href=\"#_ftnref32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a> United Nations, General Assembly, <em>National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16\/21, <\/em>A\/HRC\/WG.6\/33\/PRK\/1 (20 February 2019), para 86., available from <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/3798135?ln=en\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/3798135?ln=en<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref33\" id=\"_ftn33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a> Min, \u201cThe Viewpoints and Responses of North Korea,\u201d 125.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref34\" id=\"_ftn34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a> Min, \u201cThe Viewpoints and Responses of North Korea,\u201d 127-128. While the actual implementation of such laws remains doubtful, these legal modifications reflect the ways the international pressure induced minor changes in North Korea\u2019s behavior towards international human rights organizations and regulations. See Joanna Hosaniak, \u201cNGOs experiences in utilizing a nexus between States, NGOs and the United Nations to promote women\u2019s rights in North Korea\u201d in <em>2016 International Symposium on North Korean Human Rights: Protecting and promoting women\u2019s rights in North Korea with a focus on the UN human rights protection mechanisms, Seoul, 2016, <\/em>71-80, Seoul: National Human Rights Commission of Korea.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref35\" id=\"_ftn35\"><sup>[35]<\/sup><\/a> Min, \u201cThe Viewpoints and Responses of North Korea toward UN Human Rights Law,\u201d 124.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn36\" href=\"#_ftnref36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a> Kyung-Bae Min,\u00a0 \u201cGaehyeoggaebang-e ttaleun Jung-gug Ingwonbeobje-ui Byeonhwawa Bukhan-e daehan Sisajeom\u201d \uac1c\ud601\uac1c\ubc29\uc5d0 \ub530\ub978 \uc911\uad6d \uc778\uad8c\ubc95\uc81c\uc758 \ubcc0\ud654\uc640 \ubd81\ud55c\uc5d0 \ub300\ud55c \uc2dc\uc0ac\uc810 [Changes in China\u2019s Human Rights Legislation Following Economic Reform and Opening-up and Implications for North Korea], <em>Bukhan-ingwon Ihaeui Saeloun Jipyeong<\/em>\u300e\ubd81\ud55c\uc778\uad8c \uc774\ud574\uc758 \uc0c8\ub85c\uc6b4 \uc9c0\ud3c9\u300f[New Horizons for Understanding North Korean Human Rights] 1, ch. 8 (2012): 402, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.kinu.or.kr\/www\/jsp\/prg\/api\/dlV.jsp?menuIdx=334&amp;category=35&amp;thisPage=1&amp;biblioId=1453731\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.kinu.or.kr\/www\/jsp\/prg\/api\/dlV.jsp?menuIdx=334&amp;category=35&amp;thisPage=1&amp;biblioId=1453731<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref37\" id=\"_ftn37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a> Min, \u201cThe Viewpoints and Responses of North Korea,\u201d 123.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref38\" id=\"_ftn38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a> Min, \u201cThe Viewpoints and Responses of North Korea,\u201d 123.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref39\" id=\"_ftn39\"><sup>[39]<\/sup><\/a> Chae Yeon Kang, \u201cEconomic Meaning and Human Rights of North Korean Women\u2019s Labor: Focusing on Social Participation Policy and Influence,\u201d <em>The Journal of Asian Women <\/em>59, no. 2 (2020): 37, doi: 10.14431\/jaw.2020.08.59.2.7.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn40\" href=\"#_ftnref40\"><sup>[40]<\/sup><\/a> For the collection of documents regarding the inter-Korean competition, see \u201cInter-Korean Competition, 1961-1970,\u201d <em>Wilson Center Digital Archive<\/em>, accessed December 14, 2021, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org\/collection\/149\/inter-korean-competition-1961-1970\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org\/collection\/149\/inter-korean-competition-1961-1970<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn41\" href=\"#_ftnref41\"><sup>[41]<\/sup><\/a> Ida Casmier, \u201cThe Reality of Women\u2019s Rights in North Korea,\u201d <em>The Borgen Project<\/em>, October 23, 2020, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/borgenproject.org\/womens-rights-in-north-korea\/\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/borgenproject.org\/womens-rights-in-north-korea\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn42\" href=\"#_ftnref42\"><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/a> Yoon, <em>North Korea\u2019s Women Policy<\/em>, 27-29. For a detailed analysis of these ideologies, see also Kyung Ae Park, \u201cWomen and Revolution in North Korea,\u201d <em>Pacific Affairs<\/em> 65, no. 4 (1992): 527\u2013545, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2307\/2760318\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2307\/2760318<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref43\" id=\"_ftn43\"><sup>[43]<\/sup><\/a> Yoon, <em>North Korea\u2019s Women Policy<\/em>, 124, 194-95.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref44\" id=\"_ftn44\"><sup>[44]<\/sup><\/a> Kim, \u201cWomen of North Korea,\u201d 7.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref45\" id=\"_ftn45\"><sup>[45]<\/sup><\/a> Cited in Sunwook Kim, Wonhong Kim, Younghye Kim, and Dongryeong Kim,<em> Bukhan-yeoseong-ui Jiwie gwanhan Yeongu : Yeoseong-gwanlyeon Beob mich Jeongchaeg-eul Jungsim-eulo<\/em>\u300e\ubd81\ud55c\uc5ec\uc131\uc758 \uc9c0\uc704\uc5d0 \uad00\ud55c \uc5f0\uad6c: \uc5ec\uc131\uad00\ub828 \ubc95 \ubc0f \uc815\ucc45\uc744 \uc911\uc2ec\uc73c\ub85c\u300f[A Study on the Status of North Korean Women: Focusing on Women-Related Laws and Policies] (Seoul: Hangug-Yeoseong-Gaebal-won \ud55c\uad6d\uc5ec\uc131\uac1c\ubc1c\uc6d0 [Korea Women\u2019s Development Institute], 1992), 200.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref46\" id=\"_ftn46\"><sup>[46]<\/sup><\/a> Kim, Kim, Kim, and Kim,<em> Bukhan-yeoseong-ui Jiwie gwanhan Yeongu<\/em>, 142.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref47\" id=\"_ftn47\"><sup>[47]<\/sup><\/a> Suzy Kim, <em>Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution: 1945-1950<\/em> (New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 2013), 29.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref48\" id=\"_ftn48\"><sup>[48]<\/sup><\/a> Park, \u201cWomen and Revolution in North Korea,\u201d 747.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref49\" id=\"_ftn49\"><sup>[49]<\/sup><\/a> Kim, \u201cWomen of North Korea,\u201d 13-16.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref50\" id=\"_ftn50\"><sup>[50]<\/sup><\/a> Kang, \u201cEconomic Meaning and Human Rights,\u201d 26, 30.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref51\" id=\"_ftn51\"><sup>[51]<\/sup><\/a> Kang, \u201cEconomic Meaning and Human Rights,\u201d 8.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref52\" id=\"_ftn52\"><sup>[52]<\/sup><\/a> Ngai Pun, \u201cCh 4. Becoming Dagongmei: Politics of Identities and Differences,\u201d in <em>Made in China: Women Factory Workers in a Global Workplace<\/em> (North Carolina: Duke Univ. Press, 2005), 109-132.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn53\" href=\"#_ftnref53\"><sup>[53]<\/sup><\/a> David C. Kang, \u201cReview: They Think They\u2019re Normal: Enduring Questions and New Research on North Korea\u2014A Review Essay,\u201d by Patrick McEachern, Stephen Haggard, Marcus Noland, and Suk-Young Kim, <em>International Security<\/em> 36, no. 3 (2011): 164, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/41428112\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/41428112<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref54\" id=\"_ftn54\"><sup>[54]<\/sup><\/a> Kim, \u201cWomen of North Korea,\u201d 9.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref55\" id=\"_ftn55\"><sup>[55]<\/sup><\/a> Kim, \u201cWomen of North Korea,\u201d 17.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref56\" id=\"_ftn56\"><sup>[56]<\/sup><\/a> Kim, \u201cWomen of North Korea,\u201d 17-18.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn57\" href=\"#_ftnref57\"><sup>[57]<\/sup><\/a> While it is often thought that North Korean men who are ordinary laborers work almost for free, there is a set wage, officially set as 3,000 won. However, this is not enough to buy even a kilogram of rice, and even this payment is not readily made, which makes them heavily reliant on their wives for income. See Sunyoung Choi, \u201cFamilies under North Korean socialism, labor policy, and the crack of cellular families: Reconstructing of gender roles and marital conflict,\u201d Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), (2020): 74, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/nkdb.org\/researchreport\/?q=YToxOntzOjEyOiJrZXl3b3JkX3R5cGUiO3M6MzoiYWxsIjt9&amp;bmode=view&amp;idx=8012197&amp;t=board\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/nkdb.org\/researchreport\/?q=YToxOntzOjEyOiJrZXl3b3JkX3R5cGUiO3M6MzoiYWxsIjt9&amp;bmode=view&amp;idx=8012197&amp;t=board<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn58\" href=\"#_ftnref58\"><sup>[58]<\/sup><\/a> North Korean women who participate in market activities usually carry heavy bags of products that weigh about 50 kilograms, which often results in health problems such as hunchbacks. Those who cannot afford to start a market usually resort to street begging or stealing. See Seung-hee Lee, <em>Bukhan-ui Yeoseong Shidae<\/em> \ubd81\ud55c\uc758 \uc5ec\uc131\uc2dc\ub300 [The Era of Women in North Korea], (Seoul: Institute of North Korea Studies, 2018): 172-180.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref59\" id=\"_ftn59\"><sup>[59]<\/sup><\/a> Byung-Yeon Kim, <em>Unveiling the North Korean Economy: Collapse and Transition<\/em>, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017): 92, cited in Kim and Easley, \u201cThe Neglected North Korean Crisis,\u201d 23.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn60\" href=\"#_ftnref60\"><sup>[60]<\/sup><\/a> U.S. Mission Korea, \u201cNorth Korea\u2019s Trafficking in Persons Report (2009),\u201d U.S. Embassy &amp; Consulate in the Republic of Korea, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/kr.usembassy.gov\/061410-north-koreas-trafficking-persons-report-2010\/\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/kr.usembassy.gov\/061410-north-koreas-trafficking-persons-report-2010\/<\/a>., cited in Kim and Easley, \u201cThe Neglected North Korean Crisis,\u201d 22.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn61\" href=\"#_ftnref61\"><sup>[61]<\/sup><\/a> Erin Engstran, Caitlin Flynn, and Meg Harris, \u201cGender and Migration from North Korea,\u201d<em> Journal of Public and International Affairs<\/em>, accessed December 13, 2021, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/jpia.princeton.edu\/news\/gender-and-migration-north-korea\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/jpia.princeton.edu\/news\/gender-and-migration-north-korea<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn62\" href=\"#_ftnref62\"><sup>[62]<\/sup><\/a> Soon-hee Lim, \u201cCurrent Conditions and Issues on North Korean Women\u2019s Human Rights,\u201d Korea Institute for National Unification<em>,<\/em> accessed December 13, 2021, from <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.humanrights.go.kr\/site\/inc\/file\/fileDownload?fileid=7003923&amp;filename=Lim_Soon_Hee-PT.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.humanrights.go.kr\/site\/inc\/file\/fileDownload?fileid=7003923&amp;filename=Lim_Soon_Hee-PT.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref63\" id=\"_ftn63\"><sup>[63]<\/sup><\/a> Engstran, Flynn, and Harris, \u201cGender and Migration from North Korea.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref64\" id=\"_ftn64\"><sup>[64]<\/sup><\/a> U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, <em>2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref65\" id=\"_ftn65\"><sup>[65]<\/sup><\/a> Do Hyeong Kim, \u201cA Study on the Image of Women and Women Revolutionaries in North Korea \u2013 Focused on Education Related to the Pre-Modern and \u2018Kim Jong-sook\u2019,\u201d <em>Sogang Humanities Journal <\/em>59 (2020): 321-353, doi: 10.37981\/hjhrisu.2020.12.59.321.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref66\" id=\"_ftn66\"><sup>[66]<\/sup><\/a> Kim, \u201cA Study on the Image of Women,\u201d 342.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref67\" id=\"_ftn67\"><sup>[67]<\/sup><\/a> Mi Kyung Lee, \u201cThe Issue of North Korean women by examining gender awareness of female defectors,\u201d <em>The Korean Journal of International Relations <\/em>45, no.5 (2005): 155-178, doi: 10.14731\/kjis.2005.12.45.5.155.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn68\" href=\"#_ftnref68\"><sup>[68]<\/sup><\/a> Soram Cheon and Jung-min Noh, \u201cWomen Who Flee North Korea Also Escape a Harsh Patriarchy,\u201d <em>Radio Free Asia<\/em>, December 23, 2021, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.rfa.org\/english\/news\/korea\/women-patriarchy-12232021154512.html\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.rfa.org\/english\/news\/korea\/women-patriarchy-12232021154512.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref69\" id=\"_ftn69\"><sup>[69]<\/sup><\/a> Mason Richey, \u201cCheap talk, costly talk, crazy talk: patterns in North Korea\u2019s English language propaganda,\u201d<em> The Pacific Review<\/em> 32, no. 4 (2018): 541, doi: 10.1080\/09512748.2018.1488763.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref70\" id=\"_ftn70\"><sup>[70]<\/sup><\/a> Min, \u201cThe Viewpoints and Responses of North Korea,\u201d 129.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn71\" href=\"#_ftnref71\"><sup>[71]<\/sup><\/a> For instance, the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) based in Seoul compiles the information on human rights violations by mapping the locations of political prison camps through the use of satellite imagery. See \u201cVisual Atlas,\u201d Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), accessed December 15, 2021, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"http:\/\/www.visualatlas.org\/eng.do\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">http:\/\/www.visualatlas.org\/eng.do<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn72\" href=\"#_ftnref72\"><sup>[72]<\/sup><\/a> Heather Barr, \u201cDon\u2019t Be Fooled by North Korea\u2019s Denials on Women\u2019s Rights,\u201d <em>Human Rights Watch<\/em>, November 21, 2017, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2017\/11\/21\/dont-be-fooled-north-koreas-denials-womens-rights\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2017\/11\/21\/dont-be-fooled-north-koreas-denials-womens-rights<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn73\" href=\"#_ftnref73\"><sup>[73]<\/sup><\/a> International Labour Organization, \u201cLabor Force Participation Rate for Ages 15-24, Female (%) (Modeled ILO Estimate) \u2013 Korea, Dem. People\u2019s Rep.,\u201d The World Bank \u2013 Data, June 15, 2021, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SL.TLF.ACTI.1524.FE.ZS?locations=KP\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/SL.TLF.ACTI.1524.FE.ZS?locations=KP<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn74\" href=\"#_ftnref74\"><sup>[74]<\/sup><\/a> Seok-Hyang Kim and Hye-Jin Kwon, \u201cAnalysis on the Women\u2019s Discourse in DPRK after the Arduous March Time,\u201d <em>Unification Policy Studies <\/em>18, no. 2 (2009): 153-185, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/repo.kinu.or.kr\/handle\/2015.oak\/1410\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/repo.kinu.or.kr\/handle\/2015.oak\/1410<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref75\" id=\"_ftn75\"><sup>[75]<\/sup><\/a> Kim and Kwon, \u201cAnalysis on the Women\u2019s Discourse,\u201d 183.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref76\" id=\"_ftn76\"><sup>[76]<\/sup><\/a> Cho, Yee, and Yi, <em>Daily Lives of North Korean Women and Gender Politics<\/em>, 46.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref77\" id=\"_ftn77\"><sup>[77]<\/sup><\/a> Andrei Lankov and Seok-Hyang Kim, \u201cUseless Men, Entrepreneurial Women, and North Korea\u2019s Post-Socialism: Transformation of Gender Roles Since the Early 1990s,\u201d <em>Asian Journal of Women\u2019s Studies<\/em> 20, no. 2 (2014): 68-96, doi: 10.1080\/12259276.2014.11666182.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref78\" id=\"_ftn78\"><sup>[78]<\/sup><\/a> Sooah Lee, \u201cBukhan-yeoseong Jeongchaeg-ui Byeonhwa,\u201d 163.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref79\" id=\"_ftn79\"><sup>[79]<\/sup><\/a> Lee, \u201cBukhan-yeoseong Jeongchaeg-ui Byeonhwa,\u201d 174, 178.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn80\" href=\"#_ftnref80\"><sup>[80]<\/sup><\/a> Christian Davies, \u201cNorth Korean women pay a heavy price as Kim turns on \u2018black market breadwinners\u2019,\u201d <em>Financial Times<\/em>, January 12, 2022, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/154f7fe6-e9b9-4a4f-b590-f08afa5ca326\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/154f7fe6-e9b9-4a4f-b590-f08afa5ca326<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"#_ftnref81\" id=\"_ftn81\"><sup>[81]<\/sup><\/a> Kim and Easley, \u201cThe Neglected North Korean Crisis,\u201d 26.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn82\" href=\"#_ftnref82\"><sup>[82]<\/sup><\/a> Robert King, \u201cUpdate on North Korean Human Rights on the First Anniversary of the Biden Inauguration,\u201d <em>Center for Strategic and International Studies<\/em>, January 13, 2022, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/update-north-korean-human-rights-first-anniversary-biden-inauguration\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/update-north-korean-human-rights-first-anniversary-biden-inauguration<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn83\" href=\"#_ftnref83\"><sup>[83]<\/sup><\/a> Robert King, \u201cNorth Korea Human Rights and South Korea\u2019s Upcoming Presidential Election,\u201d <em>Korea Economic Institute of America<\/em>, January 20, 2022, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/keia.org\/the-peninsula\/north-korea-human-rights-and-south-koreas-upcoming-presidential-election\/\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/keia.org\/the-peninsula\/north-korea-human-rights-and-south-koreas-upcoming-presidential-election\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a rel=\"nofollow\" id=\"_ftn84\" href=\"#_ftnref84\"><sup>[84]<\/sup><\/a> Leif-Eric Easley and Sea Young Kim, \u201cUtilizing artificial intelligence to improve women\u2019s rights in North Korea,\u201d <em>NK News<\/em>, July 19, 2021, <a rel=\"nofollow noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nknews.org\/2021\/07\/utilizing-artificial-intelligence-to-improve-womens-rights-in-north-korea\/\" target=\"_blank\" data-wpel-link=\"external\" class=\"ext-link\">https:\/\/www.nknews.org\/2021\/07\/utilizing-artificial-intelligence-to-improve-womens-rights-in-north-korea\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h3>Further Reading on E-International Relations<\/h3>\n<p><!-- Similar Posts took 498.821 ms -->            <\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>While North Korea is notorious for one of the world\u2019s worst human rights abuses, the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) often makes political statements and laws&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":7870,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[2219,1865,8848,8847],"class_list":["post-7869","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-world-news","tag-defense","tag-labor","tag-mobilization","tag-reputational"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7869","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7869"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7869\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7870"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7869"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7869"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/celebratenaija.com\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7869"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}